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pointed out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s in d e f e n d a n t s evidence and i s 
defendant precluded from rais ing t h i s i s sue where he f a i l s t o 
c i t e to the record in support of h i s claim? 
2. Was the evidence s u f f i c i e n t to submit the case to 
the jury? 
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plain error to allow the jury to view the tape? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
JERRY J . DIBELLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860220 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, J e r r y J . D i b e l l o , was charged with second-
degree murder, a f i r s t - d e g r e e fe lony , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978). 
Defendant was convic ted of second-degree murder by a 
ju ry in December, 1985, in the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , in and 
for Tooele County, S t a t e of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
p r e s i d i n g . Judge Rokich sentenced defendant on January 6, 1986, 
t o an inde t e rmina t e term of f i v e y e a r s t o l i f e in t h e Utah S t a t e 
P r i son . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
About 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, Ju ly 2 1 , 1985 Tammy Dibe l lo 
was found dead in her t r a i l e r house a t the S & W T r a i l e r Park in 
Tooele County by a neighbor (T. 49 , 5 1 - 5 2 ) . Her face was 
seve re ly beaten and she was s tabbed s ix t imes in the ches t and 
neck (T. 5 2 , 301-04) . She had been dead for approximately 8 to 
15 hours before i n v e s t i g a t o r s a r r i v e d j u s t s h o r t l y before noon 
<T. 293 , 319) . 
Tammy Dibe l l o and defendant were hiisband and wife but 
were s epa ra t ed f ive days before Tammy's death (T. 86, 138, 162-
63, 868-69) . Defendant l e f t the couple ' s t r a i l e r on July 15 
after an outing to a nearby canyon (T. 138, 162, 868-69) . After 
that outing, on the way home, defendant fought with one of the 
party members after a t r a f f i c accident (T. 42 , 159-60, 875). All 
of the wi tnesses except defendant said that defendant purposely 
caused the accident (T. 41-42, 159-60, 872-73) . Defendant 
received blows t o the l e f t eye, l e f t ear and mouth that caused 
some bleeding (T. 42-43 , 161, 875). Defendant claimed the 
bleeding was profuse but others described i t as minimal (T. 161 , 
536-37, 582, 628, 637 876-77) . Upon returning to the ir home, 
defendant decided t o leave h i s wife and commented t o neighbors 
that she f l i r t e d with a l l of the men who went to the canyon that 
day (T. 45 , 878, 1005) . Defendant s l ep t in h i s truck that night 
near some sand dunes and drove to h is daughter's home early the 
next morning (T. 536, 482 , 628, 636) . 
At h i s daughter K r i s t i 1 s home, defendant bathed and 
washed h i s hair and changed c l o t h e s (T. 539, 584-85, 637) . He 
remained at K r i s t i ' s unt i l Friday, July 19 , 1985 when he spent 
part of the night elsewhere (T, 540, 586 ) . Defendant returned t o 
K r i s t i ' s , but Kris t i and her three housemates asked defendant to 
leave on Saturday, July 20 (T. 540-42 , 592-93 , 639, 889) . Kris t i 
and the others t e s t i f i e d that defendant drank several beers that 
day and took several more with him when he l e f t (T. 543-45 , 564, 
588-89 , 633, 639) . Some of them thought he was drunk (T. 543-45, 
564, 619, 640-41) . 
Around 10:00-10:30 p.m. defendant arrived a t the S & W 
Trai ler Park and found h i s wife at a f r i e n d ' s home (T. 110, 130, 
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895) . The two re t ired t o the i r t r a i l e r where defendant was going 
to pick up some clothing (T. 110, 131, 893-95, 903) . Several 
neighbors heard arguing coming from the Dibe l lo t r a i l e r around 
11:00 to 11:30 p.m. (T. 250-51, 259-62 f 505) . One said that the 
argument included some d iscuss ion about c lothing (T. 505-06) . 
After several minutes, the arguing ended abruptly and a door 
slammed (T. 262, 264-65, 505) . 
Several neighbors and defendant's daughter and son - in -
law observed defendant and Tammy Dibe l lo f i g h t verbal ly and 
phys ica l ly during the marriage (T. 83 , 156-57, 227-30, 529-32, 
579-80). Kris t i and her husband also said that defendant became 
v io lent or abusive when intox icated (T. 543-45, 589) . 
Shane Jacobsen, a fr iend of the D i b e l l o s , spent most of 
the weeknights before the murder with Tammy Dibel lo in her t a i l e r 
(T. 163, 226). Tammy said she was afraid of defendant and wrote 
a l e t t e r to him expressing that fear (T. 108, 162, 651) . 
Defendant to ld a fr iend that he would k i l l Tammy if she ever l e f t 
him (T. 488) . That same friend saw Tammy holding hands with 
Jacobsen around the same time period (T. 491)* 
Jacobsen said he was ins ide the Dibe l lo t r a i l e r on the 
night Tammy died (T. 174) . He waited there for her unt i l about 
10:30 p.m. and decided t o go home but l e f t her a note (T. 172, 
175) . Jacobsen arrived home at 11:00 p.m. (T. 178, 233, 682-83) . 
The note he wrote was found crumpled on the f loor in the morning 
when Tammy's body was discovered (T. 714) . 
Larry Smith, an acquaintance of the D i b e l l o s , went t o 
their t r a i l e r around 11:30 p.m. on July 20 (T. 48 ) . Smith raised 
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no response; the dogs did not bark and there was only one l i g h t 
on in the bedroom at the back of the t r a i l e r (T. 49 , 68-69 , 72) . 
Smith returned t o the t r a i l e r at 9:30 a.m. on July 21 and saw 
blood on the door (T. 49-50) . Through the window, Smith could 
see Tammy lying on the couch with her face swollen and body "cut 
up" (T. 51-52) . He heard the dogs barking (T. 49) and went to 
c a l l the po l i ce (T. 5 5 ) . 
Areas of defendant's ches t , l e f t arm and hand and r ight 
thumb t e s t e d p o s i t i v e for the presence of human blood on July 22, 
1985 (T. 425-26, 429 ) . There was not enough blood t o determine 
the type (T. 429) . Blood that could not be i d e n t i f i e d as human 
was present on h i s r ight hand, r ight arm and l e f t front thigh (T. 
429) . Head ha irs found between Tammy's f ingers in her right hand 
had c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s imi lar to defendant's hair (T. 431 , 435 -37 ) . 
Most of the switches and handles and the s teer ing wheel and seat 
of defendant's truck a l s o t e s t e d p o s i t i v e for human blood or at 
l e a s t unknown blood (T. 440-47, 453-54) . Under normal 
condi t ions , one expects that bathing w i l l remove a l l t races of 
blood from the skin although the t e s t chemical i s very s e n s i t i v e 
and blood could be d i lu ted by water and spread on the body (T. 
481) . 
Pr ints from the four f ingers of defendant's l e f t hand 
were found on the door of the t r a i l e r (T. 340, 360, 971). These 
pr in t s were made in blood (T. 687-88) . Two f ingerpr int experts 
p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d the pr in t s as defendant's although 
defendant's expert t e s t i f i e d that they could not be i d e n t i f i e d as 
defendant's (T. 360, 799, 976). 
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On July 20, one witness said defendant wore light-
colored clothing not the black pants and white shirt he wore when 
arrested (T. 820-21). Defendant said that he wore the same 
clothes when arrested on Monday that he wore Saturday night (T. 
896). 
Defendant admit ted being a t t he t r a i l e r park on Ju ly 20 
but denied murdering h i s wife (T. 895, 918). He sa id t h a t Tammy 
f e l l down coming out of t h e i r ne ighbor 1 s t r a i l e r and h i t her 
mouth causing profuse b leeding (T. 898) . She t r i e d to d r i v e h i s 
t ruck t o go buy a coke but gave up and went inp ide t h e i r t r a i l e r 
a t h i s i n s i s t e n c e (T 899, 900). Defendant claimed he "dabbed" a t 
Tammy's mouth with t i s s u e but i t would not stoj? b leeding (T. 899-
901) . Defendant sa id he ga thered h i s c l o t h e s and when he l e f t , 
Tammy was ou t s ide in someone's car t a l k i n g with t h r e e unknown 
persons (T 904-905). He sa id he did not argue with her nor see a 
l e t t e r addressed t o him from Tammy exp la in ing her fear of him nor 
did he see the note w r i t t e n t h a t n ight by Shahe Jacobsen (T. 906-
07 ) . He did n o t , however, t e l l t he po l i ce abdut t h e car and 
i n d i v i d u a l s he saw t h a t n ight nor did he t e l l them t h a t Tammy 
f e l l down t h a t n igh t a l though he thought a t tibial he could have 
made the bloody f i n g e r p r i n t s a f t e r dabbing a t Tammy's mouth (T. 
938, 945-46, 954) . 
Defendant claimed a t t r i a l he did not know why he was 
a r r e s t e d u n t i l the p o l i c e t o l d him but he admi t ted t h a t he a t 
f i r s t denied having gone t o t h e S & W T r a i l e r Park a t a l l on J u l y 
20 (T. 911-13, 958) . Although the o f f i c e r who ques t ioned him 
desc r ibed defendant as cold and unemotional , defendant exp la ined 
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that he was shocked by the news of Tammy's death and did not 
e a s i l y display emotion (T. 730, 751 f 913). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The prosecutor 's arguments which were 
a l l eged ly disparaging to defense counsel were not c i t e d by 
appellant in h i s brief . Absent support in the record for h i s 
c la ims, defendant has waived the i s s u e for appeal. 
Defendant did make one object ion to the prosecutor 's 
arguments at the time some a l l eged ly improper remarks were made. 
The jury was admonished t o disregard the remarks and, thus , 
defendant received the appropriate remedy. 
In any event none of the remarks complained of were 
improper or were matters the jury was not e n t i t l e d to consider. 
The prosecutor was merely engaging in the normal, adversarial 
pract ice of pointing out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s in the defense and of 
a l e r t i n g the jury to those parts of the w i t n e s s e s ' testimony that 
lacked c r e d i b i l i t y . 
POINT I I . The evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o support the 
j u r y ' s verd ic t that defendant murdered Tammy D i b e l l o . 
POINT I I I . Defendant did not properly preserve the 
i s sue of the admission of certa in hearsay evidence that the 
v ic t im feared the defendant. Even i f he had preserved the i s s u e , 
the evidence was probably admissable to show that the v i c t i m ' s 
f a c i a l i n j u r i e s were probably not accidental as defendant 
claimed. 
As for the statement defendant made that he would k i l l 
Tammy if she l e f t him, defendant's object ion i s m e r i t l e s s . While 
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i t was probably prejudic ia l to admit t h i s evidence, i t was not 
unfairly pre jud ic ia l . 
POINT IV. Admission of the video tape at t r i a l was not 
objected to on the record and therefore was waived unless i t s 
admission was plain error. Mere cumulativeness of the video tape 
should not be considered revers ib l e error where defendant did not 
object t o the other photographic evidence on the grounds that i t 
was gruesome and nonessent ia l . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN 
THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENTS. 
Defendant f i r s t argues t h a t the p r o s e c u t o r made 
improper comments about de fense counse l t o t h e jury which so 
prejudiced him that he was e n t i t l e d to a new t r i a l . Defendant 
does not specify in h i s brief what these a l l e g e d l y "disparaging" 
remarks were, but argues general ly for several pages that 
"disparaging" remarks about defense counsel aite revers ib l e error. 
There are several reasons why defendant's claim on t h i s i s sue 
should not be considered on appeal. 
F i r s t , defendant f a i l s to refer to pages in the record 
supporting h i s argument on appeal. Normally, such a f a i l u r e to 
c i t e to the record requires t h i s Court to assume regular i ty in 
the proceedings below. State v. 01mosf 712 Pf2d 287 (Utah 1986) . 
Second, because defendant does not indicate to what 
comments he i s re ferr ing , t h i s Court cannot determine whether he 
objected to the comments when they were a l l eged ly made. To 
prevail on appeal, defendant must have made a timely and s p e c i f i c 
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objec t ion and ind ica te from the record that he made such an 
objec t ion . Utah R. Evid. 1 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; State v. B a r e l l a , 714 P.2d 
287 (Utah 1986); S ta te v. McCardell, 652 P. 2d 945 (Utah 1982) . 
Because defendant c i t e s to nothing in the record indicat ing that 
an objec t ion was made, t h i s Court should affirm h i s convic t ion , 
g t a t e v. Hales , 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . 1 
Third, defendant re fers in h i s point heading t o a 
motion for a new t r i a l that he claims should have been granted. 
In a memorandum supporting h i s motion for a new t r i a l , defendant 
s tated that the prosecutor prejudiced him by point ing out the 
defense incons is tency in presenting an expert wi tness refut ing 
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant's f ingerpr in t s when defendant 
t e s t i f i e d that h i s bloody f ingerpr ints might have gotten on the 
door because he had blood on h i s f ingers after Tammy Dibe l lo was 
injured f a l l i n g down a stairway on the night she died. During 
the prosecutor 's argument on t h i s subjec t , defendant did object 
on the grounds that the prosecutor was making defense counsel 
i n t o a wi tness and asked that the jury be admonished to disregard 
the remarks (Partial T. 5 7 ) . The court sustained the objec t ion 
and ins tructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor 's remarks 
(Partial T. 5 8 ) . If t h i s Court chooses t o review defendant's 
claim of error based upon h i s reference to t h i s motion to 
d i smiss , then the t r i a l c o u r t ' s refusal to grant a new t r i a l 
should be affirmed. Defendant received at the time of h i s 
1 Defendant did move for a mis tr ia l after the jury re t i red t o 
de l iberate (T. 1011). Such a belated motion should not, however, 
to cure the waiver that occurred by f a i l i n g t o objec t . See State 
v* Hales , 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) . 
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object ion the proper remedy for improper commentsr assuming 
arguendo that the comments were, in f a c t , improper, c , f . State 
v. Smith, 675 P. 2d 521, 526-27 (Utah 1983); Stpte v. Hales, 652 
P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) . 
Moreover, these remarks were not improper but were 
within the range of permissible argument (See Appendix A for text 
of remarks). The prosecutor w i l l normally try to point out 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s in the defense evidence. This i s a natural 
outgrowth of the adversarial proceeding and i s merely good 
advocacy. While i t may, in f a c t , be prejudic ia l to the defendant 
in the sense that the jury may be persuaded t o discount h i s 
evidence, i t i s not unfairly pre jud ic ia l . 
F ina l ly , defendant objec t s for the f i r s t time on appeal 
to the prosecutor's use of the words "I think" when out l in ing for 
the jury the S t a t e ' s vers ion of the f a c t s and the S t a t e ' s reasons 
why the jury should discount defendant's s tory. Notably, 
defendant did not object to the portions of the argument he now 
claims were error nor did he c i t e to them in h i s motion for a new 
t r i a l . For these reasons, t h i s Court should affirm defendant's 
convic t ion . Smith, 675 P.2d at 526-27; HalesK 652 P.2d at 1292. 
Even i f the defendant had objected, the use of the 
words "I think" did not create error in t h i s case . Review of the 
port ions of the argument s e t out in Appel lant 's Brief at 6, 
revea l s nothing that the jury was not e n t i t l e d to consider in 
rendering i t s v e r d i c t . So long as the jury was not asked t o 
consider matters they would not be j u s t i f i e d JLn considering, 
there was no error . State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 
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422, 426 (1973) . For t h i s reason, defendant's convict ion should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT 
THE CASE TO THE JURY 
Defendant claims for the f i r s t time on appeal that the 
evidence against him was so insubstant ia l that the case should 
never have been submitted t o the jury. His argument, 
never the l e s s , r e l i e s on the standard of review used by t h i s Court 
t o determine whether the evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o convict 
defendant of second-degree murder. Because the S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n 
that there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to convict defendant r e s o l v e s 
the quest ion of whether the evidence was s u f f i c i e n t to submit the 
case to the jury, the argument below addresses only the former 
standard of review. 
This Court reviews the evidence in the l i g h t most 
favorable to the j u r y ' s verd ic t and must presume that the 
evidence supporting that verdict must have been bel ieved by the 
jury. S ta te v. P i erce , 722 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1986). The 
presence of c o n f l i c t i n g evidence does not ind ica te that the jury 
must have be l ieved that evidence because the jury need not accept 
the defendant's vers ion of the f a c t s but may disregard them in 
whole or in part . I d . 
In t h i s case , much of the evidence was c ircumstantial 
but was s u f f i c i e n t for the jury to convict defendant. As more 
completely out l ined in the fact statement above, several 
w i tnesses acknowledged defendant's tendency toward angry or 
v i o l e n t behavior when in tox ica ted (T. 543-45, 589 ) . They 
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witnessed previous physical and verbal outbursts between 
defendant and h i s wife (T. 83, 156, 157, 227-3Q, 529-32, 579-80). 
Defendant did consume alcohol the day of h i s w i f e ' s murder (T. 
543-45, 564, 588-89, 633, 639) . Defendant admitted to v i s i t i n g 
h i s estranged wife on the night of her murder #nd admitted that 
she was bleeding profusely from her mouth while he was there , 
although he claimed that t h i s injury was accidental (T. 895, 898-
901). Defendant thought he may have l e f t a bloody handprint on 
the ir t r a i l e r door after he helped h i s wife to nal t the flow of 
blood from her mouth (T. 938, 945-46) . 
One and a half days after h i s w i f e ' s death, defendant 
retained traces of blood in numerous p laces on h i s body and h i s 
truck retained t races of blood throughout the Jpassenger 
compartment (T. 425-26, 429, 440-47, 453). Although defendant 
attempted to explain these f a c t s by implying that the blood on 
his body was from h i s own i n j u r i e s sustained a week e a r l i e r and 
had not been removed because he had not bathed very thoroughly 
during that time, the jury was not required to accept that 
explanation when others t e s t i f i e d that he had bathed (T. 539, 
584-85, 637, 887-88) . The jury was a lso not required to be l i eve 
that the blood ins ide h i s truck got there from Tammy Dibe l lo 
herse l f when she attempted to drive to the s tore after her injury 
or from defendant "dabbing" at her face with a t i s s u e to stop the 
flow of blood from her "accidental" mouth injury (T. 899-901). 
Nor was the jury forced to be l i eve that Shane Jacobsen and/or 
John Cornwall k i l l e d Tammy Dibe l lo as an occul t s a c r i f i c e as 
defendant implied throughout the t r i a l . Only defendant claimed 
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to have seen John Cornwall drinking blood in an occul t r i tua l and 
Cornwall denied any involvement with the occul t (T. 787-88, 956) . 
Jacobsen a l s o denied personal involvement in occu l t a c t i v i t i e s 
<T. 209, 212-17) . 
Defendant offered no explanaton for the hair found 
between Tammy's f ingers and i d e n t i f i e d as having c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
s imi lar to h i s own (T. 431 , 435-37) . While Jacobsen's hair was 
about one-half inch long at the time of Tammy's death and the 
hair Tammy held was 3-1/2 inches long, defendant would have l iked 
the jury to be l i eve that Jacobsen was Tammy's a s s a i l a n t (T. 431, 
756, 766) . 
Several w i tnesses heard arguing coming from the Dibe l lo 
t r a i l e r on the night of the murder and heard a door slam, though 
defendant denied that he argued with h i s wife that night (T. 250-
51 , 259-62, 264-65, 906-07) . One wi tness thought i t was the same 
vo ices she had heard arguing before and another overheard that 
the subject of the argument was c lothing (T. 260-274, 505-06) . 
Defendant admitted that he went to the t r a i l e r park that night to 
pick up his c lothing (T. 895). Just before and sometime after 
the argument, wi tnesses heard a very loud v e h i c l e drive through 
the area (T. 248, 265) . Defendant's truck was very loud because 
of a de fec t ive muffler (T. 545-46, 595, 878) . 
While defendant's f ingerpr int expert said that the 
bloody part ia l handprint found on the t r a i l e r door could not be 
i d e n t i f i e d as defendant 's , two experts t e s t i f i e d that i t was 
p o s i t i v e l y defendant's (T. 340, 360, 799, 971 , 976 ) . These two 
experts thought that there were areas of the print that were 
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different but they were explainable differences that did not 
affect the identification. The jury was free to determine which 
of the experts to believe and apparently chose to believe the 
testimony that supported the identification of the print as 
defendant1s. 
Based upon the foregoing synopsis of the evidence, 
resaonable minds could determine that defendant was guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. State v. Schreudery 726 F.2d 1215, 1226 
(Utah 1986). The evidence was not so insubstantial that 
reasonable jurors must have entertained a reasonable doubt of his 
g u i l t . Id. There fore , t h i s Court should affium d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n . 
POINT I I I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADMIT INADMISSIBLE 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
Pr ior t o t r i a l defendant f i l e d a motion t o suppress 
hearsay evidence t h a t Tammy Dibe l lo was afraicS of him p r io r t o 
her death (T. 138-39) . Several arguments occurred on t h e i s s u e 
before and during t r i a l and the judge u l t i m a t e l y ru l ed t h a t he 
would not admit p o r t i o n s of t he ev idence . On a p p e a l , defendant 
complains t h a t one of Tammy's s t a t emen t s was repea ted by Shane 
Jacobsen and a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by Tammy was e r roneous ly admi t ted . 
As argued below, admission of t h i s evidence w&s not e r r o r . 
F i r s t , t h e t r i a l cou r t ru led t h a t t h e p rosecu tor could 
not mention the hearsay tes t imony during h i s ppening s ta tement 
and t h a t t he cour t would r u l e on i n d i v i d u a l w i t n e s s e s a s the 
i s s u e arose (T. 26) . The S t a t e abided by the ru l ing* 
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While Shane Jacobsen was t e s t i f y i n g , howeverf the 
fol lowing was exchanged; 
Q: What did you do l a t e r that evening? 
A: Tammy asked me if I d idn' t mind staying 
with her because she was fr ightened of 
Jerry, so I stayed that night and 
stayed there. 
Mr. Ke l l er : Your honor, may we approach 
the bench at t h i s time? 
(T. 162) . Thereafter, no object ion or further d i scuss ion appears 
on the record unt i l three wi tnesses l a t e r when defendant objected 
outs ide the j u r y ' s hearing on the bas is that the court had not 
f i n a l l y ruled on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the evidence and defendant 
wished to preserve h i s objec t ion (T. 286-87) . The court then 
s ta ted that the answer should be s tr icken and the State agreed 
(T. 287) . The court then ruled that the statement would be 
s tr icken pending a f ina l rul ing on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the 
evidence (T. 287) . Later, the court granted defendant's motion 
to suppress statements made by Tammy Dibe l lo to third p a r t i e s 
before her death that she feared defendant (T. 524 ) . Defendant 
did not remind the court of i t s rul ing that Shane Jacobsen 1s 
volunteered testimony on the i s sue would be s tr i cken and the jury 
was never admonished to disregard the testimony on the record. 
Defendant's f a i l u r e to t imely object to the testimony 
volunteered by Shane Jacobsen at the time i t was offered waived 
the i s sue for appeal. As a general rule , a defendant must object 
to admission of evidence a t t r i a l even though a p r e t r i a l motion 
to supress was made. State v. Les ley . 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) . 
This same rule should apply where an object ion i s untimely and 
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where, even though sustained, the defendant fa i led to renew the 
objection and remind the court to admonish the jury to disregard 
the testimony. 
The l e t t e r defendant complains of wcis not included in 
defendant 's p r e - t r i a l motion. Both pa r t i e s indicated to the 
court during t r i a l tha t they should "discuss" the l e t t e r and 
perhaps resolve the issue prior to i t s being offered (T. 524). 
This discussion, however, was off the record and no objection was 
made when the l e t t e r was admitted during Tracy AA's testimony (T. 
524, 651-52). This Court can only speculate as to what occurred 
during the off- the-record discussion but in the absence of a 
record objection must assume tha t the t r i a l c6urt properly 
admitted the l e t t e r or that defendant abandoned h i s object ion. 
See State v. Jensen f 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (Utah 1986); S ta te 
v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983); And see S ta te v. Cook, 714 
P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (references to matters outside record wi l l 
not be considered). 
Moreover, the hearsay evidence defendant complains of 
was not en t i r e ly inadmissible. Evidence of the v i c t im ' s fear of 
the defendant i s admissible where the defense of accidental 
injury i s ra i sed . S ta te v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah 
1977). Defendant here claimed tha t par t of T^ mmy Dibe l lo ' s 
i n ju r i e s resul ted from an accidental f a l l down a stairway. Thus, 
the evidence tha t Tammy feared defendant was relevant to show 
that Tammy's fac ia l i n ju r i e s a t l e a s t were probably not 
accidental as defendant claimed. 
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I n t e r e s t i n g l y , another witness t e s t i f i e d that Tammy was 
"scarea" and defendant neither objected at t r i a l nor raised the 
i s sue on appeal, (See testimony of B. J. Jackson at T. 108 ) . 
Defendant's f a i l u r e to object to t h i s testimony, as argued above, 
i s a waiver of any claim of error in i t s admission. 
F ina l ly , defendant complains about the testimony of 
Tinley Gibbons that defendant s tated t o her on July 1 3 , 1985 that 
he would k i l l h i s wife i f she ever l e f t him. Defendant i n i t i a l l y 
objected to t h i s evidence claiming that i t ' s unfair prejudic ia l 
a f f e c t outweighed i t s probative va lue , and the court took the 
matter under advisement (T. 276-286) . When Ms. Gibbons resumed 
her testimony, the statement came in without object ion (T. 488) 
and no ruling on the i s sue appears in the record. Although the 
rul ing i s not on the record, i t can be f a i r l y assumed that the 
t r i a l court determined that the evidence should not be excluded 
as unfair ly prejudic ia l under Utah R. Evid. 403. 
This Court w i l l not overturn a Rule 403 d e c i s i o n unless 
the tr ia l , court c l e a r l y abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n and created a 
l i k e l i h o o d that i n j u s t i c e re su l t ed . State v. Royball , 710 p.2d 
168 (Utah 1985) , S ta te v. P i erce , 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986) . 
There was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n in admitting defendant's 
statement. The statement was c l e a r l y relevant to show 
defendant's motives and mental s t a t e jus t prior to the crime and 
could f a i r l y be interpreted as a threat or discounted by the jury 
as a comment made by many persons when angry as defendant 
asser ted in h i s argument to the court. There was no danger of 
the jury becoming confused or being misled by the statement even 
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though defendant claimed the jury would be confused or misled 
because he claimed he l e f t Tammy not v i c e vers^. Because 
admission of the testimony was not a c lear abu$e of d i s c r e t i o n 
t h i s Court should not overturn the t r i a l court ' s dec i s ion . 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO RECORD OF AN OBJECTION TQ THE 
VIDEO TAPE AND IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR TO 
ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE TAPE. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the t r i a l court erred 
in allowing the jury to view a video tape of the crime scene that 
included views of the v i c t i m ' s body. Although there were other 
photographs of the body that were admitted, he does not a l l e g e 
that these were gruesome or p r e j u d i c i a l . He appears t o argue 
that the video tape was prejudic ia l because i t was cumulative of 
other evidence. Notably, however, defendant m3de no record of 
h i s object ion to the video tape at t r i a l . When the s ta t e offered 
the tape for viewing, defense counsel s t a t e d : 
I previously s tated my object ion in 
chambers to that . I be l i eve the court 
overruled that objec t ion . 
(T. 696) . There i s nothing in the record t o ind icate what 
defendant's object ion might have been. In the absence of a 
timely and s p e c i f i c object ion on the same grounds raised on 
appeal, t h i s Court should affirm the convic t ion . S tate v. Davis, 
689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984) . Unless , however, the t r i a l court 
committed p la in error in admitting the video tape. See S ta te v. 
Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985); Utah R. Evic}. 103(d) . 
I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d that M t l h e trial! c o u r t f s rul ing on 
the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence w i l l not be reversed absent a 
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showing that the trial court BO abused its discretion as to 
create a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v. Royball, 
710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985), citing State v. McCardell, 652 
P,2d 942f 944 (Utah 1982). With respect to the admission of 
photographic evidence like that at issue here, this Court in 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), set forth the following 
rule: 
We have frequently s ta ted and applied the 
rule that color photographs of the body of 
the victim—even photographs tha t a re 
gruesome—are not inadmissible if they are 
probative of essen t ia l f ac t s , even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
663 P.2d a t 63. The Court added t h a t "the key considerat ion in 
the appl ica t ion of t h i s ru le has been the relevance of the 
photographs." I_d. F ina l ly , i t s ta ted tha t the relevance of the 
proposed photographs must be weighed against the r isk of creat ing 
undue pre judice : 
[T]he court should determine whether the 
viewing of the photographs by the jury would 
create a subs tant ia l danger of undue 
prejudice agains t the defendant, and if so, 
whether tha t danger subs tan t i a l ly outweighs 
the photographs' e s sen t i a l evidentiary value. 
The more inflammatory the photograph, the 
greater the need to e s t ab l i sh i t s e s sen t i a l 
evident iary value, Commonwealth v. 
ffcaramuzzino, 455 Pa. a t 381, 317 A. 2d a t 
226, and, conversely, the more essen t ia l the 
evident iary value of the photograph, the 
greater the defendant 's burden to require i t s 
exclusion on the basis tha t i t s inflammatory 
nature would be pre judic ia l to him. The 
point of the reference to "essent ia l 
evident iary value" in the context of 
po ten t i a l ly pre judic ia l photographs of the 
v i c t i m ' s body i s t ha t such photographs would 
general ly be inappropria te where the only 
relevant evidence they convey can be put 
before the jury readi ly and accurately by 
other means not accompanied by the potent ia l 
prejudice. 
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663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original). Having articulated these 
rules, the Garcia Court went on to hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting four photographs which 
showed different angles of a homicide victim bloodied by stab 
wounds. It concluded that these photographs, although gruesome, 
were not overly prejudicial and were relevant to show the area 
where a witness saw the defendant drop the body, to show the 
nature of the v i c t i m ' s wounds and thus the defendant's s ta t e of 
mindf and to corroborate an expert w i t n e s s ' s testimony that there 
was not enough blood on the ground for the stabbing to have 
occurred where the body was found. Id. 
Unfortunately, the prosecutor never asserted on the 
record in t h i s case that the video tape was of e s s e n t i a l 
evidentiary value , as t h i s court has s tressed he must do where 
the photographs sought to be admitted are gruesome. See State v. 
Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, (Utah 1986). This i s because the defendant 
did not make a record of h i s Rule 403 object ion and require the 
State to respond on the record. Nor, i s there any record of the 
cour t ' s weighing the prejudic ia l e f f ec t and evident iary value of 
the video tape. Thus, the only review that t h i s Court can 
accomplish i s to determine whether admission tof the video tape 
was pla in error requiring a new t r i a l even absent a record 
object ion . 
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The portion of the v ideo tape shown t o the jury was 
approximately 6 minutes long .2 Most of the time i s spent viewing 
the outside of the t r a i l e r door and the in t er ior of the t r a i l e r 
with approximately two minutes spent viewing the v i c t im. Tammy 
Dibe l lo i s seen ly ing on the couch, her face and chest covered 
with blood. Only the neck wound i s c l ear ly v i s i b l e and appears 
as a dark gash in the l e f t s ide of her neck. The chest wounds 
are not v i s i b l e as they are hidden by Tammy's s h i r t which i s 
blood soaked. While t h i s Court has not defined "gruesome", 
defendant claims that the video tape was gruesome and most people 
would probably agree with that a n a l y s i s . 
However, compared with those that have previously been 
found p r e j u d i c i a l , the video tape f a l l s short of those 
photographs admitted in S ta te v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 
512 (1968), where the t r i a l court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
admitting color s l i d e s , "one of which depicted the deceased's 
head, showing the base of the skul l after the skul l cap and brain 
had been temoved by the patho log i s t and the skin peeled over the 
edge of the skul l showing the empty brain c a v i t y , and the other 
of which showed a top view of the empty cav i ty ." State v. Wel ls , 
603 P. 2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979) . Nor does the tape approach the 
photographs admitted in S ta te v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) . 
There are no autopsy procedures depicted nor obscene ges tures nor 
does the blood appear coagulated and s t i cky upon the v i c t i m ' s 
f a c e , nor are her eyes open and s tar ing i n t o the camera as 
2 while i t i s not c lear p r e c i s e l y where the tape was stopped, the 
wi tness 1 narrat ive i n d i c a t e s that i t was stopped after the 
bedroom views and before re-enter ing the l i v i n g room where 
Tammy's body l a i d (See R. 695-696) . 
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appeared in the Cloud photos. 
Furthermore, the video tape was not Completely devoid 
of evidentiary value. Because the prosecution has the burden of 
proving a l l the elements of the crime, relevant photographs 
should be admissible even though other evidence may also 
es tab l i sh the f ac t s . Ju r i e s are not required to believe even 
expert testimony offered in support of the S t a t e ' s theory on 
cause or method of death. Also, photographs s^rve an important 
function of i l l u s t r a t i n g and c lar i fy ing testimpny and are 
relevant and admissible for t h i s purpose. See State v. Ross, 28 
Utah 2d 279, 284, 501 P. 2d 632, 635 (1972); Stftte v. Lawson, 585 
S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. 1979); S ta te v. Gi lber t , 671 P.2d 646, 647 
(N.M. 1983). F ina l ly , criminal defendants often incor rec t ly 
assume tha t a jury i s unable to view unpleasant exh ib i t s , which 
accurately depict the crime, without losing a l l perspect ive. As 
s ta ted in S ta te v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46, 475 P.2d 543 (1970); 
There i s some sor t of paradox involved where 
one commits a heinous act and then clomplains 
that the very sight of what he has done i s so 
revol t ing to the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of nolrmal 
people (the jurors) that i t would so d i s t o r t 
t h e i r judgment tha t they could not f a i r l y 
determine his gu i l t or innocence of crime. 
The prosecution was duty-bound to prove a l l 
of the elements of the crime by whatever 
evidence was ava i l ab le . This included the 
photographs. 
25 Utah 2d a t 50, 475 p.2d a t 546. See also People v. Long, 38 
Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 630, 536-37 (1974) (observing 
t h a t the effect of unpleasant or gruesome photos on the jury i s 
often exaggerated). Defendant requests t h i s Court to san i t i ze 
h i s t r i a l for a violent crime. As Chief Jus t i ce Hall noted in 
his dissent ing opinion in Cloud; 
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All evidence tends to prejudice the jury, and 
photographs are no except ion. The fac t that 
the photographs depict a gruesome scene 
created by defendant i s no reason to exclude 
them from evidence i f they are otherwise 
admiss ib le . 
722 P. 2d at 756. This was not a case , such as Cloudf where the 
defendant conceded any of the f a c t s in controversy but, in f a c t , 
he i n s i s t e d on h i s innocence. Moreover, i t i s important that the 
prosecutor did not unduly s t r e s s the photographs for any 
prejudic ia l purpose before the jury as t h i s Court found occurred 
in Cloud. If t h i s court f inds that the photographs in t h i s case 
were both gruesome and n o n e s s e n t i a l , the Court should a l s o f ind 
that they were harmless. As s ta ted in Garcia and noted above, 
the fact that the evidence was cumulative of other testimony 
should not render the photographs inadmiss ib le . The video tape, 
while unpleasant i s not any more graphic than many currently 
popular movies and t e l e v i s i o n programs. To assume that the jury 
cannot refrain from impassioned react ions t o viewing photographic 
evidence of what has been described to them by a medical examiner 
unfair ly de trac t s from the j u r y ' s sworn promise to remain 
impartial and return a verdic t based upon the evidence rather 
than personal f r a i l t i e s . This i s e s p e c i a l l y true where the jury 
has already viewed other s imilar photographs that were not 
objected t o . 
The fact that the videotape was cumulative of other 
evidence does not render its admission plain error in this case 
because defendant did not object to admission of the other 
photographic evidence at all. As a result, the trial court would 
have been justified in concluding that the video tape was not 
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o b j e c t i o n a b l e on grounds of gruesomeness or n o n e s s e n t i a l i t y and 
the mere f a c t of c u m u l a t i v e n e s s should not prompt t h i s Court t o 
over turn d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the f o r e g o i n g , the S t a t e t e q u e s t s t h i s Court 
t o a f f i r m d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . 
RESPECTFULLY submit ted t h i s /4m day of January , 1987. 
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ADDENDUM 
JERRY DIBELLO AND SHE WAS AFRAID OF h) 1 M FOR A REASON, AND 
THAT REASON ENDED UP ON JULY 20, 198S|. 
MR. KELLER HAS THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL ATTEMPTED 
TO MAKE A BIG DEAL OUT OF THE FI NGE RFJR I NTS . HE REALLY 
PRESSED THE EXPERT THE STATE CALLED 0N THE FINGERPRINTS. 
HE SPENT A LOT OF TIME ON IT AND HE ^TAKED A LOT OF HIS 
CASE ON IT. NOW, I!M ASKING YOU WHY HE MIGHT HAVE DONE 
THAT IF THE DEFENDANT, WHEN HE GOT UP HERE ON THE WITNESS 
•STAND, SAID: SURE, 1 COULD HAVE MADE THE FINGERPRINTS. 
MY WIFE FELL DOWN, HAD A LOT OF BLOOD COMING OUT OF HER 
MOUTH. IT COULD HAVE GOT ON MY FINGERS AND, YEAH, IT'S 
POSSIBLE THAT MY FINGERPRINTS GOT ON THE DOOR. 
WHY WOULD MR. KELLER SPEND ALL THAT TIME? I 
WONDER IN MY MIND, DID THE DEFENDANT TELL MR. KELLER ABOUT 
THAT FALL-DOWN INCIDENT BEFORE THE TRIAL STARTED? IF HE 
HAD, WOULD MR. KELLER GO INTO THAT MpCH DETAIL AND ATTEMPT 
TO QUESTION AND CHALLENGE THE FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY THAT 
MUCH? 
MR. KELLER: YOUR HONOR, FOR THE RECORD, I 
WISH TO ENTER AN OBJECTION AT THIS TIME. COUNSEL IS NOW 
PUTTING ME IN THE POSTURE OF ATTEMPTING TO MAKE BE A WITNESS 
IN THIS TRIAL. HIGHLY IMPROPER. WE HAVE NO OPPORTUNITY 
TO RESPOND. 
1 ASK THAT THIS JURY BE ASKED TO DISREGARD THE 
LAST REMARKS. 
bl 
1 MR. ELTON: 1 SUBMIT IT, YOUR HONOR. 
2 THE COURT: THE JURY WILL] DISREGARD THE LAST 
3 REMARKS. THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED., 
4 MR. ELTON: THE DEFENDANT TESTIFIED ON THE 
5 WITNESS STAND THAT HIS FINGERPRINTS COULD HAVE GOT ON THE 
6 FRONT DOOR IN BLOOD BECAUSE OF WHAT HAPPENED. NOW, 
7 MR. KELLER, THE NEXT POINT HE MADE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO SHOW 
8 THAT THE FINGERPRINT EXPERTS WEREN'T ABLE TO DETERMINE HIS 
9 FINGERPRINTS WERE ON THE DOOR. 
10 1 SUGGEST THAT DESPITE WHAT MR. KELLER HAS 
11 SAID, THAT THE EXPERTS THAT THE STATE HAS CALLED HAVE GIVEN 
12 CONCLUSIVE TESTIMONY. THEY WERE THE DEFENDANT'S FINGERPRINT 
13 ON THE DOOR. THEY INDICATED THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCE 
14 IN THEM AND THEY EXPLAINED THOSE DIFFERENCES. I THINK THEY 
15 DID THAT FAIRLY CLEARLY. 1 THINK THAT. SCOTT PRATT DID THAT 
16 THE BEST OF ANY OF THEM, INDICATED THAT HE COULD SEE THE 
17 DIFFERENCES, AND AS I RECALL HIS TESTIMONY, HE COULD SEE 
18 THE RIDGES COMING DOWN ABOVE, AND WHEN THEY DON'T COME DOWN, 
19 HE ATTRIBUTED THAT TO THE PERSON PULL1|NG THEIR HAND AWAY 
20 FROM THE BLOOD. 3 SAY THAT BASED ON HlS EXPERIENCE WITH 
21 THE FBI AND THE STATE OF UTAH HE WAS A|BLE TO EXPLAIN THOSE 
22 DIFFERENCES, AND BECAUSF OF THAT AND MANY POINTS OF COMPAR1 -
23 SON HE WAS ABIE, IN HIS OPINION, TO MA|KE A POSITIVE 
24 IDENTIFICATION, SUCH AS RIO SUMMEPS. 
25 ] SUGGEST TO YOU THAT ThE DEFENDANT'S EXDERT 
5>E 
